By COL Paul T. McHenry, Jr. (MD)*
A resent article about merging Army and Air Forces reserves into the National Guard suggests that a review of the reserve subject matter might be of interest. It is often said that history repeats itself. The United States has a proud tradition of citizen soldiers who were instrumental in creating and defending the nation. However, the wars of the 20th Century were fought in foreign lands and with the lack of internal crisis the need for classic militia virtually disappeared. Times are changing. Is this the era for a return to the militia viz all military being an active or reserve part of one of the federal Armed Forces.
Maintaining an adequate military force in peacetime is unlikely. Budgetary considerations limit a full time Armed Forces to the extent that most all agree that reserve components have to be in the mix of defense preparation. Downsizing is already in process. The Armed Forces components, both regular and reserve, are in competition with each other for resources. The National Guard (NG), particularly Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserves (USAR) are our focus of inter service rivalry.
The present day militia are the state defense forces (SDFs) of some 25 states, also called State Guard or Military Reserve. These citizens train as volunteers.
More often than not in the turf fight between National Guard (NG) v. Federal Army and Air Force Reserves, the suggestions have been that the NG should be closed and merged into the Reserves. This time around the call is for abolition of the Federal Reserves. An article by MG Drennan Clark, Nevada Adjutant General and LTC David Pennington, both Air NG, titled "Turn out the Lights, Lock the Gate," Armed Forces International, Sept. 1996, has the subhead "The time has come to eliminate the Army and Air Force Reserves." The authors claim the constitutional right of NG to the whole reserve turf because NG is militia. In our view NG has the label "Militia" but little else of the Militia of the Constitution.
Charles E. Heller, Twenty First Century Force, a Federal Army and a Militia, SSI U.S. Army War College, June 1993, accedes to the to the idea that ARNG is to remain in being. The Militia to which he refers is the ARNG, which he views as not being ready for Army maneuver combat roles without further active duty training. Actually, he defers to the lobby power of the NG and assumes that the NG has to be tolerated because of Congress.
"The Army has consistently underestimated the political clout of the National Guard as exercised through two organizations, The Adjutant General Association (AGA) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and, as a consequence, has had difficulty in structuring a peacetime force."
The 20th Century begins with existing state militia called "National Guard." The Federal Army Reserve begins in 1908 with a way to get more physicians in uniform. In 1916 the National Defense Act created more of a comprehensive federal reserve force, with the NG as the primary manpower source. Federal status for NG was required for foreign war service because of a 1912 opinion of the Attorney General. The ruling was that there is no constitutional authority for use of militia in foreign (overseas) operations. The reason is that the Constitution empowers Congress "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”" This defensive character of militia had been assumed during the whole course of history following the Constitution. Militiamen re enlisted as Federal soldiers to serve in the Mexican War (1846) and likewise in the Spanish American War (1898). The wars of the 20th Century would not be staged in the Continental United States. To take part in the combat the NG had to convert from militia to foreign war making, i.e. become part of the U.S. Army. This was eventually done by creating a dual status for NG members. They became part of the Army of the United States (AUS).
After World War II the U.S. Army Reserves, and after 1947 the Air Force Reserves, expanded into numerically significant components. Before World War II the Organized Reserve Corps were lists of individuals, more than units. NG was unit organized and called to Federal duty on that basis.
It appears that many writers discredit the militia as a fighting force. Militia requires time to get ready for maneuver combat. Heller is saying this about NG. The War of 1812 is most often cited in support of the proposition that militia is not an effective fighting force. Clark and Pennington refer to "a numerically superior militia force [which] was routed by British troops outside Washington, resulting in the sacking of the capital." However, had they continued the story, for three more weeks, August 24 to September 12, 1814, they would note that same British force mauled by the defenders of Baltimore. The successful defense of Baltimore was by citizen forces under a state appointed commander. Later the defensive victory at New Orleans was a great boon to the United States. These were successful operations and show the militia effective when defending home turf, against a known present danger. However, the militia, as a maneuver force into Canada in the early 1812 phase of the War and in the later defense of Washington, were not successful. But as defenders fortified on home turf and in guerilla operations they were winners.
The great classic of economics, Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, written in 1776, points out that Militia, which operates in the field over a period of time, turns from its primary citizen character into a standing Army. He says the American colonial militia would in time convert into enough of an army to be effective against the British. Again, by 1814 the American forces in New York had become well trained and were under able leadership. The Second invasion into Canada was successful, although the Americans later withdrew.
Thus, War of 1812 history seems to show that deployment of militia in maneuver combat requires lead time for what is now called post mobilization training. This is what Heller says is required for combat ready NG armor and infantry. This is likely true regardless of whether the part time soldiers entering war duty are NG or Reserve.
Let us first review Clark and Pennington and their view that the Federal Army and Air Force Reserves be eliminated. They say the Constitution itself "did not leave force structure to Congress or the President." The Founders "included a blueprint ... in the Constitution itself." The authors repeat the commonly accepted fact that the Founders feared a standing army and therefore placed their faith in a well regulated militia. The short answer is that the NG of today is not the Militia of the Constitution. However, let us go on:
These NG proponents say that the reasons that Federal Reserves were created was the view of militia as an ineffective fighting force. Also, there were constitutional impediments. The overseas "use of the militia led Congress to create a duplicate reserve force in the early 1900’s that it could utilize without restraint." Then Clark and Pennington claim NG is "... the reserve force that, when mobilized for a national emergency, brings with it the nation’s will to fight." In support of this point they cite a 1994 Article of MG Raymond F. Rees, Oregon Adjutant General, in the National Guard magazine. General Rees "observed that in the last 100 years this nation has fought five major wars. In the four we won, the Guard provided most of the combat power. In the one we lost, the Guard was kept on the sidelines." And, they go on to say that the NG comes from thousands of communities and when mobilized for major war brings with it popular support. "Leave the Guard at home, and you court defeat." However, neither Reserves or NG were called for Vietnam. And, the NG only totals 400,000 out of a population of more than 260 million.
The other side responds to the Clark and Pennington call for immediate abolition of the Federal Army and Air Force Reserves in an editorial in The Reserve Officer (Oct. 96 Ed) entitled "The Whole Reserves." The article is by former ROA Executive Director, MG Evan L. Hultman. He says: "The renewed proposals for a merger concocted in the National Guard articles are a rehash of that attempt more than 30 years ago. The merger plan was bad and unworkable then, and its no different today." He concludes that the Reserve Officers Association and National Guard Association have worked side by side, an alliance "of sound and effective teamwork." General Hultman views the NG article as containing "radical views ... a great disservice to the cause of the National Guard." That attempt of more than 30 years ago was by then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who proposed placing the Reserves under NG control.
The background of this turf fight between Reserves and NG is reviewed in the Charles Heller, A Federal Army and Militia article. Heller covers a significant NG vs. USAR report which was issued June 30, 1948 by a DoD committee chaired by Assistant Secretary of Army, Gordon Gray. That report called for no NG at all and for one Federal Reserve Force for each service. That Reserve force would be formed under a clause of the Constitution which empowers Congress "To raise and support Armies...," not the Militia clause, quoted above. The Gray Committee “is convinced that the same forces can no longer be expected to perform both local and national functions and that a modern striking force cannot be prepared adequately under state control."
The Heller model for the XXI Century Force features early deployment capability of a modern Army in maneuver warfare. National Guard artillery brigades are classified as combat support (CS). As distinguished from infantry and armor, artillery may be effectively deployed without such delay. He refers to Desert Storm, but may we note that it took six months to get ready.
Also, Richard Davis, in The Officer, May 1996, says that effectiveness of Army NG combat brigades "is highly uncertain." We translate this to mean ARNG combat forces are not suitable for early deployment. Davis also says the Air NG dedicated to continental air defense (attack over the North Pole) is no longer needed.
Heller goes into the USAR as furnishing combat service support (CSS) and combat support (CS). The CSS and CS federal reservists would be on call as needed by the active Army, particularly when deployed. And also, he links the USAR with Federal Emergency Management. Even if correct as to the need for major NG unit training, it would seem to one on the sidelines that NG is as much in the Total Force as ever, even more likely to be called now than during the Cold War.
The history has been strong Army preference for U.S. Reserves. In 1916, General Leonard Wood and the views of military authorities were overruled by Congress. However, when reviewing NG critics, one rather quickly imagines jealousy, that NG officers, particularly Generals, may be an underlying cause of poor effectiveness reports. With NG the power is divided so the state Governors have an appointment of Officers role. If the NG were merged into USAR, the state military power center headed by the state Adjutant General would change to some equivalent Federal office.
On the other hand, when one hears of standing on constitutional principles, doubts immediately surface about having a good argument. The answer appears obvious. The NG serves as part of the Army when on Federal duty. Rather than re enlist for the War as in the Mexican and Spanish American Wars, the NG personnel are already Reserves from their initial enlistments.
Moreover, there is more U.S. Army than Militia in the other aspects of the NG: The NG is totally of Federal members. Not one additional person may be added over the number authorized for the unit, which is designed exclusively for expeditionary warfare. National Guard may not be expanded even to handle an emergency overload in its own state. The state Governor may call out the NG for state active duty, but not NG employees. (The employees are 12.9% of ARNG and 30.9% for Air NG.) State use of federal property (guns, trucks, radios, etc.) is by permission only. For appointment the NG officers must be federally "recognized," and rather than preserving the NG unit, as such, the officers can be deposed or transferred by the Army the moment the NG is activated. Militia is by nature a short term reaction type force, and by the Act of 1792 was not to remain more than 90 days on Federal duty. And, it would serve under the command of its own officers. In 1957, President Eisenhower removed any doubt about state powers by ordering the Arkansas NG into Federal service, over state active duty call of the Governor.
Heller says the importance of NG is that it can be used in a law enforcement capacity. The Federal Army (and more recently Air Force) is precluded from law enforcement by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). Law enforcement roles, such as search and seizure and arrest, seem clearly prohibited to these Federal forces, presumably including their Reserves. The Posse Comitatus Act is of post Civil War vintage, and follows adverse reaction to Union Troops serving as policemen.
This in turn leads to uneasiness over the war on drugs and the widening role of the U.S. Military. The Washington Post (Nov. 29, 1996) covers the expanding activity by the military. Some NG are regularly involved in counter drug efforts, but we imagine that they are more likely to be full time employees. The Rand Report on National Guard State and Federal Missions, reviewed in the Summer 1996 edition of this Journal, seems to favor USAR in comparable state mission roles to NG. Fear of the Federal Military being used as police has already been cited as a reason for Militia to offset the danger of a standing army.
BG James P. Hartley, Army Times (Oct. 26, 1992), supports the Gray Committee version. Hartley says the NG should be incorporated in the USAR. "As for state missions, there are 30 states with State Defense Forces." These he believes will create "a more effective and efficient Total Force of active and reserve units." To what extent the state defense forces take over the state missions role remains to be seen. Merger of NG into the Reserves is not mandated for the state defense force to act as described by General Hartley. The NG might be assigned a support role for state defense forces when overloaded.
General Rees mentions the loss of popular support as the reason for losing the War. May we again digress to the War of 1812 and point out the relevance of popular support. In that day New England was the prosperous trading part of America and bitterly opposed war with England. The Declaration of War barely passed the U.S. Senate, 19 to 13. These states withheld troops and money. Query: How much was the first Canadian invasion hurt by that popular opposition?
This popular support concept may well relate to voluntary enlistment. Conscription appears no longer available as a means of filling the Army ranks. Compulsory service requires favor by the public in general, such as total war. Drafting one man in fifty or so developed misgivings. The Draft was abandoned more than 20 years ago, although the Selective Service remains open.
Further, popular support seems to require a threat. Most people do not enlist ahead of the danger being known. They tend to respond after the fact rather than be prepared. In Baltimore and New Orleans defenses were prepared because a clear and present danger was known to the citizens. And, following the attack, there were long recruiting lines the day after Pearl Harbor not the day before. The Cold War had an identified enemy. Now we do not know when or where some aggressor will surface.
We visualize a Regular Army with full time troops and therefore available for immediate deployment. Reserves and/or NG furnish CS and CSS units or personnel are likewise subject to immediate call. Colonel Harry Summers, in Military (Dec. 1996), points out a problem with the Reserves. Some CSS personnel have served nine months in Bosnia and are being extended. This sort of active duty has to have an adverse affect on civilian careers. Also, we are told that NG recruiting is down to the point of concern among those involved. The Report of the Reserve Policy Board (March 1996), however, has NG only slightly down. According to Gil Coronado, Selective Service Director, in remarks before the SGAUS, the DoD spends some $2.2 billion a year recruiting. And, the lure for recruits is pay and benefits. If young people are reluctant to join the NG and Reserves, the Total Force will become constricted.
The state mission of Militia is to support civil government in the preservation of life, protection of property and maintenance of law and order. Also, state missions include disaster and emergency service. If America should be invaded, or undermined internally with what amounts to insurrection, the Militia would have more of a defense military role. The states have the primary duty of security of person and property, but run to Washington for emergency funding. To adopt the Hartley view which is reliance upon Militia, i.e. state defense forces, suggests that the states assume this primary responsibility.
We conclude this paper as it started with the concept that history repeats itself. War of 1812 history often says Militia is ineffective in combat, but with Militia defensive strength and a long lead time, the U.S. eventually won what in the long run was a victory. America thereafter had respect among other nations. Then and now there is the necessity of lead time to train a strategic reserve of citizens to be effective in maneuver combat.
The Constitution Framers regarded the Militia with great favor. They feared a future standing army. Also, they had a budgetary problem. For financial reasons they were to rely upon the Militia which already existed. Today, budgetary concerns again suggest turning to the Militia. All the State Defense Forces put together would not cost as much as the $2 billion spent on recruiting. SDFs train as volunteers and do not require an immense overhead of bureaucracy or retirement benefits, or attack helicopters or tanks. If for no other reason, the time for a revival of State Militia is at hand.
We predict that there will be a Regular Army with part time professional Reserves, both Federal and NG. These are Army and Air Force. The remaining factor is a viable State Defense Force. That is the "blueprint" of the Constitution.
*COL Paul T. McHenry, Jr. (MD) (1929-2002) was the Executive Director of the State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) until December 2000, formerly long time Judge Advocate for the SGAUS, former JAG of the Maryland Defense Force and President of the Maryland State Guard Association. This paper represents the opinion of COL McHenry and is not necessarily that of the SGAUS.