Helping
Americans Defend Themselves:
The State Defense
Force Improvement Act of 2003
By John E
Stone (VA) President, U.S. Freedom Foundation and SGAUS Member
America's most
cost-effective military reserve force is now on the Congressional agenda
for the first time since 1987, thanks to freshmen U.S. Representatives
Joe Wilson (R-SC) and Lincoln Davis (D-TN). The
State Defense Force Improvement Act of 2003, HR 2797, seeks to provide
solid and indisputable federal recognition of the role that State Defense
Forces should play in homeland security as the reserve to the National
Guard, and as supplemental military resources for the states.
The bill has
a simple and straightforward goal the congressional direction that these
military reserves can and should be fully incorporated into the nation's
overall homeland defense strategy at both the federal and state level,
and available to support local, state and federal agencies as needed at
the call of their respective governors.
There are certainly
a host of other improvements that should be made within the current state
defense force structure. But
what we learned over the last 18 months in developing this legislation
is that this single need official congressional direction is the necessary
legal cornerstone for all other reforms. If
we succeed in seeing theWilson-Davis bill passed into law, we may find
we don't need additional federal measures to fully integrate and expand
defense forces.
Further, even
if we do still have legislative needs, we wont know what they are until
after using this first real chance to actively work with various state
and federal agencies as unquestioned partners.
The main initial
objection encountered when discussing this pending legislation with DOD
agencies was a belief that no legislation is necessary. In
the eyes of the Pentagon, since Congress revised the present state defense
force structure in 1958 to exist entirely under state control, the states
could do anything they pleased with their reserves, with no DOD or Congressional
input or approval required. Therefore
DOD's unofficial position was simply "hands-off." With
the near total lack of congressional direction for DOD involvement with
defense forces, that position, while over-cautious, is not legally imprudent.
But as defense
force supporters know all to well, "hands-off" also translates into a near
total inability to incorporate the capabilities of defense forces into
federal-state homeland security missions, or procure even the most rudimentary
supplies, uniforms, or equipment through established channels that are
open to scores of even non-military volunteer organizations.
This hasn't always
been the case. During World
War II, the War Department directly provided rifles, ammunition, uniforms
and equipment for up to 100,000 state guardsmen, who assumed the duties
of deployed national guardsmen. The
state guards received mostly World War I vintage Enfield rifles and helmets,
but that's all that was necessary for the majority of the constabulary
duties they were assigned. The
2003 equivalent would be surplus Vietnam-era steel pot helmets and M-14's,
in lieu of Kevlar and M-16's.
Nor is a "hands-off"
policy universally held within DOD today. In
a Joint Forces Staff College Joint and Combined Warfighting School research
paper, "Forces for NORTHCOM and Homeland Security?" published in
March, LTC Arthur N. Tulák, USA, LCDR R. W. Kraft, USN, and MAJ
Don Silbaugh, USAF accurately identify state defense forces as "the third
tier of military forces", with federal-only troops being first (active
and reserve components), joint federal-state troops second (the National
Guard), and state-only troops third the state defense forces.
Tulák,
Kraft and Silbaugh also point to the active service of SDF's nationwide
over the past two decades, noting that "SDF's have been called to state
active duty in support of several disaster/terrorist attack responses,
including the following: 1980
Winter Olympics at Lake Placid (New York Naval Militia); 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill recovery operation (Alaska Naval Militia); 1996 winter
storms (New York Guard, Virginia State defense Force, Oregon State Defense
Force and Maryland Defense Force); 2001 World Trade Center terrorist
attack (New York Guard, Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia)."
The authors single
out the 9-11 military service of state troops as proof-positive of the
homeland defense capabilities these forces bring to America's overall military
forces. "The example of New
Jersey Naval Militia actions in response to the World Trade Center attacks
superbly demonstrates how several SDFs are already integrated into the
consequence management aspects of HLS. In
response to the attacks, the New Jersey Naval Militia's Disaster Medical
Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps were both mobilized at Staten Island,
New York, to assist survivors and rescue workers in support of Task Force
Respect and a unit of Naval Guardsman was also mobilized to assist the
FBI and National Guard with evidence collection at Staten Island. Naval
Militia were also activated to participate in Operation NOBLE EAGLE, where
the Naval Guardsman provided 24-hour staffing for the New Jersey National
Guard's joint Operations Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey; provided boat
crews to support the rescue and recovery efforts in New York City with
ferry services across the Hudson River; provided waterborne security that
allowed for the opening of the George Washington Bridge; augmented the
U.S. Navy's waterborne security forces at U.S. Naval Weapons Station Earle
with boats crewed by Naval Militia sailors, who performed picket boat duty
to patrol the U.S. Navy's security zone to protect U.S. Navy and U. S.
Coast Guard Ships while loading munitions; relieved State Marine Police
crews; and provided waterborne security for New Jersey's nuclear power
plants."
Not to be out
done by NORTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's
LTC Brent C. Bankus wrote in depth earlier this year of the World War II
history of the Pennsylvania State Guard. Bankus
described the Guard's wartime service as exemplary, and an important precedent
to consider in America's current homeland security challenge. "With
the new menace of Terrorism and the likelihood of increased overseas campaigns
for our active and reserve forces, the organization and utilization of
SFD forces for their traditional role of internal state security missions
is certainly worth further study. In
about half the states and some territories there are SDF units operating
with little fanfare, on a "shoestring budget," accomplishing many of the
same missions as those of their predecessors for World War I, World War
II, the Korean War and the most recent crisis, the attacks on the homeland. The
foundation for a useful homeland defense force is already in place, so
why not expand on it?"
The bill begins
the process of expansion with six basic steps:
1. Official
congressional recognition of state defense forces
as in integral military component of America's homeland defense.
2. Total
voluntary compliance by the states and DOD
with the guidance provided in the Act, to ensure that the states retain
ultimate control of their reserve forces, and that DOD is protected from
distraction from their greater warfighting responsibility.
3. States
without existing defense forces are encouraged to authorize forces and
states with forces are encouraged to improve them. While
this may seem a matter of trivial semantics, it is a major federal policy
step forward from current Title 32 language of "states may" a somewhat
grudging compromise to objections over the federalization of our current
National Guard during the 20th Century to actual congressional
endorsement and encouragement of state military reserves for the 21st
century.
4. State
Defense Force training compliance and coordinating with DOD standards
meets the "hands-off" issue head-on. For
state defense forces to support the National Guard effectively, they must
comply with every mission-consistent training and certification standard
of DOD. That has proven impossible
while DOD maintains a "hands-off" policy, and while wide variances exist
between the various defense forces as to training, certification and rank. This
section will provide both a tremendous opportunity and challenge for defense
forces to overcome the legitimate force readiness concerns of DOD and skeptical
Adjutants General in states without existing reserves.
5. Increased
access to surplus federal equipment through DOD authorization to determine
reasonable access regulations for defense forces. This
section will likely be one of the most challenging to implement. DOD
sources report on actual willingness to open up direct access, but face
a myriad of varying state surplus disbursement regulations that could conflict
with a DOD access policy for defense forces. Nevertheless,
DOD is given a congressional nudge to get started, and defense force leadership
will need to put a legislative shoulder to the wheel in quickly and accurately
reporting requirements and conditions in their state to NGB through their
Adjutant General in order to move this proposal forward.
6. DOD
protection for direct or indirect liability and costs
ensures that DOD is held blameless for any and all damages incurred by
state defense forces. All
coordination and assistance costs are to be borne by the states, as a condition
for DOD assistance. This should
end any lingering budgetary concerns of DOD, but still leaves open similar
concerns of State Adjutants General over their state budgets and liability.
Longtime supporters
of the state defense force concept will undoubtedly note that if the Department
of Defense, Governor, State Adjutant General, or State Director of Homeland
Security chooses not to initiate, expand, or improve a force, there are
no mandates forcing them to do so. But
unlike the present situation, there will no longer be any doubt that the
initiation, improvement, and expansion of these forces is the precise intent
of Congress under Title 32, and that the Department of Defense is authorized
and encouraged by federal law to see that this intent is brought to fruition.
If we do see
the bill passed into law, that's when the real work begins. As part of
the feedback process on this legislation, we've learned that not only do
state defense forces have need of DOD assistance, DOD and our State Adjutants
have need of defense force help:
1. Compliance
with NGB Readiness Reports: An accurate and uniform registry of defense
force personnel numbers, training certification, equipment, arms status,
and deployment capabilities.
2. Uniform
physical standards requirements: how many troops meet the Army Physical
Fitness Test; how may troops meet neither but are nevertheless fully capable
of performing administrative duties?
3. State
legislative clarification that defense force activities cannot result in
unfounded liability exposure for state military departments.
4. State
legislative action ensuring that defense force funding cannot detract from
National Guard funding proper, nor should defense forces ever compare with
state National Guard funding or missions, and expansion of funding sources
for state defense forces outside DOD and state military department budgets.
5. State
legislative clarification on liability protection and credentialing requirements
of professionals such as physicians, attorneys, electricians, and engineers
while serving in state defense forces, or while assigned to National Guard
units on state active duty.
6. Consideration
of future federal legislative clarification of whether state defense forces
should also be recognized as organized militia under Title 10, as are naval
militias.
7. Consideration
of codification of NGB regulatory status as official federal agency for
defense forces.
8. Improvement
of federal agency capabilities to assist and coordinate defense forces.
9. Development
and adoption of uniform training and rank procedures, to ensure that a
given soldier from one state has the identical and jointly recognized qualifications
as a peer in another, and that both meet mission-consistent National Guard
standards for their MOS and rank.
There is a lot
of work to be done to enact the State Defense Force Improvement Act of
2003 before this Congress adjourns for good in the fall of 2004, and a
great deal of work afterwards to ensure the bill's promise becomes reality.
But it's a job
well-worth doing. There is
no other proposal on the table that can provide 250,000 troops specifically
tasked with homeland security at no additional cost to the federal budget.
There is no other
structure that can provide the troop assignment flexibility for homeland
defense coordination between the Department of Defense, the Department
of Homeland Security, state National Guard and Military Departments, state-level
Homeland Security Departments, FEMA and its state equivalents, and a host
of other agencies at all levels of government. State
Defense Forces are the one military force available that can be assigned
by their Governor to wherever they are most needed, in total coordination
with deferral efforts.
It is a revival
of the historic principle of Americans taking responsibility for defending
themselves through voluntary military service at the local level, a concept
that has come full circle since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. And
it is a concept that demands immediate action if we are to firmly secure
our homeland against future attack.